

CONFERENCE OF THE TEN NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Wednesday, 15 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. C.T. STONE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. ŠIMOVIC̣

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAṢ

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLIE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the one hundred and thirty-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today I should like to dwell on two questions which had been dealt with in the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers regarding our proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1, articles 5-8) for the destruction in the first stage of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons except for an agreed, strictly limited number to be retained only by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the second stage. I intend to deal with questions of control and the so-called question of the concealment of delivery vehicles.

First, I should like to point out that the Soviet delegation has already given the necessary explanations regarding the general principles and criteria to be used as a guide in determining the number of missiles to be retained. The Soviet Union has also submitted its proposals regarding control over the implementation of these measures. Consequently we now have everything necessary for a positive solution of this question. Now, more than ever, mankind is faced with the imperative need to eliminate without delay the danger of a nuclear missile war. We have before us a plan which, by bringing the positions of the sides closer together, opens the way to the solution of this historical problem, not only without jeopardizing the security interests of States but, on the contrary, by creating conditions which will really ensure the security of all States.

From the discussions which have taken place here, everyone can see that the majority of the members of our Committee have clearly expressed themselves in favour of beginning disarmament in such a way as to eliminate the danger of a nuclear missile war as quickly as possible. But precisely on this point we meet with the very determined reluctance of the Western Powers to come to an agreement on serious disarmament measures or to agree to the cessation of the armaments race. This reluctance to come to an agreement was particularly apparent during the discussion of this question.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

At one of our last meetings the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, put forward (ENDC/PV.129, pp.28 et seq.) a preliminary evaluation of our proposal in which he essentially expressed a negative attitude towards this initiative of the Soviet Union. I shall not go into the substance of this evaluation today, especially since it was a preliminary one. We hope soon to receive a clear reply to the substance of our proposal. I must emphasize that the nature of the reply to this question will have a considerable influence on the work of our Committee, because it will show whether the United States is prepared, together with other peace-loving States, to seek a way to a mutually-acceptable solution of disarmament questions, or whether it will avoid reaching agreement as before.

It has not escaped our attention that the United States is trying to cover up its negative position on disarmament questions with a number of artificial arguments and considerations, among which control questions play a far from insignificant role. We are well acquainted with this device from many years' previous experience. In the course of many years of disarmament negotiations since the Second World War it has happened more than once that, as soon as we came to the point of discussing the concrete proposals of the Soviet Union, the Western Powers have avoided reaching agreement on the substance and, by putting the question of control in the forefront, led the whole business into an impasse.

The same thing is happening now. Day after day for half a year we have seen how the representatives of the Western Powers avoid stating their attitude towards the substance of the Soviet proposal. At the same time they put forward more and more new demands with regard to control in connexion with the Soviet proposal under consideration. As far back as December 1962 the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, told us (ENDC/PV.90, pp.32,33) that an indication of the attitude of the Soviet Union to the question of control would help us considerably in evaluating the potential possibilities and consequences of its new proposal.

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For the sake of achieving agreement, the Soviet Union took a great step towards meeting the position of the Western Powers. It agreed (ENDC/PV.114, p.40) to accept the establishment of control over the remaining missiles directly at the launching sites. At the same time we pointed out that the number of launching sites must not be greater than the number of missiles retained, and that these sites must be liquidated by the end of the second stage simultaneously with the liquidation of the remaining missiles.

Of course, this proposal of the Soviet Union cannot be set in opposition to its general position on the question of control over disarmament, as the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee try to make it appear. The fundamental position of the Soviet Union on this question, as is well known, is that the scope of the control measures must correspond strictly to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures to be undertaken. The Soviet proposal provides for the liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons. To this measure the control measures also correspond. The inspectors of the international disarmament organization will verify on the spot the destruction of missiles, military aircraft, surface vessels and submarines and artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivery of nuclear weapons. They will be able to verify the transfer to peaceful production of all plants previously engaged in the production of missiles, bombers, submarines and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons. International inspectors will also be present at the sites where missiles are launched for exclusively peaceful purposes. They will be present at the launchings and thoroughly inspect every missile and every satellite before it is sent to explore outer space.

It is clearly stated in the Soviet proposals that all States parties to the agreement must provide the international inspectors with all the necessary facilities to enable them to carry out their duties without difficulty in supervising the liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Our draft treaty also provides in the first stage of our proposed disarmament programme for a number of other control measures the implementation of which will preclude any possibility of secret preparation for war. The implementation of the Soviet plan of measures for the first

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stage of disarmament, in conjunction with effective control measures, would give all States the firm assurance that the danger of war no longer exists and that their security is at the right level.

In stage II of disarmament the Soviet Union envisages a considerable broadening of international control. It proposes to place the whole atomic industry under control and to destroy all stockpiles of nuclear weapons under the supervision of international inspectors. The implementation of these measures would mean that new teams of international inspectors would appear in all plants producing fissionable materials and in all factories, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components. This means that under the Soviet plan a widely-ramified branch of modern industry now existing in the United States, in the Soviet Union and in a number of other countries would be placed under international control.

As you see, the Soviet Union proposes such extensive control over nuclear disarmament measures that any attempt on the part of any party to violate the treaty would be quickly exposed. The Soviet Union is unsparing of control measures for the purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the disarmament measures by the parties. But I repeat again: for the purpose of verifying disarmament measures and not for the purpose of control over remaining armaments. In the first case it would really be control over the fulfilment of the provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; in the second case it would be a matter of military intelligence under the label of control over remaining weapons.

Of course, all these proposals of the Soviet Union on control questions are well known to our Western partners in these negotiations. Nevertheless the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, tried on 3 April with a naive look to interpret the Soviet Union's proposal for control over the agreed number of missiles remaining until the end of stage II in the sense that it was --

"... the first sign given by the Soviet delegation in this Conference that its Government may have revised its position regarding verification of remainders." (ENDC/PV.117, p.16)

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Since it appears from that statement of the United Kingdom representative that he pretends to have, or really has, a wrong idea of the interdependence which must exist between disarmament measures and control measures, apparently we ought to give him additional clarification on that score. The Soviet draft speaks of the complete destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the very first stage of disarmament. And this means that appropriate control over the implementation of these measures must be established, including control over the agreed number of missiles to be retained by way of exception. With regard to the other types of armaments the situation is quite different. In the first and second stages they would not be destroyed but only reduced. Therefore the question of control over the remaining types of armaments does not arise at all. We imagine that the representatives of the Western Powers understand this essential difference beyond all doubt.

Yet the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, said on 24 April that in his opinion the Soviet proposal --

"... is not adequate to provide sufficient assurance, because it leaves out the most important problem of giving the parties the assurance that no armaments are clandestinely retained or produced ..." (ENDC/FV.124, p.35)

Somewhat earlier, on 3 April, another United States representative, Mr. Mark, disclosed quite frankly what the United States would like. He said:

"What we would be anxious to know is whether there were any undeclared launching sites which had been built or retained clandestinely in violation of the treaty. We should also want to learn whether there was any clandestine stockpile of missiles or any clandestine production of such armaments. To have adequate assurance on those points would require a much more extensive and carefully devised arrangement than the mere inspection of declared sites". (ENDC/FV.117, p.26)

Underneath this phraseology of Mr. Mark's, just as in the aforementioned statement of Mr. Stelle, lies hidden a frank demand for the establishment of control over all existing armaments right from the start of stage I -- that is, the establishment of control without disarmament, a control which is essentially indistinguishable from plain reconnaissance.

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World public opinion has long since condemned such importunate demands by the Western Powers, and under its pressure they have been compelled to abandon them. But the desire of the Western general staffs and intelligence services to penetrate into the territory of the Soviet Union is so great that the Western representatives try time after time to revert to this subject. Yet it requires no very great insight to see that control over armaments is designed to discover the defence system of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries at a time when not a single practical step on the road to disarmament will have been taken and when the armaments race and military preparations are going on at a frenzied rate.

In such conditions, to give intelligence services an opportunity to discover the defence systems of States and find out the exact location of vitally-important defence installations would be tantamount to encouraging the forces of aggression in their plans for preparing an attack on peace-loving countries. It should be borne in mind that it is proposed to do all this in circumstances where, under the United States disarmament plan (ENDC/30), the United States and its NATO allies would still retain at their disposal 70 per cent of their missiles and military aircraft, all their military bases on foreign territories, and all their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Is not that the reason why the United States disarmament proposals are welcomed with such enthusiasm in certain military departments: because these proposals enable them to kill two birds with one stone, namely to maintain their nuclear potential for carrying out an attack and, having obtained information on the location of military objectives on Soviet territory, to weaken the defence capability of the Soviet Union?

Speaking on 10 July 1962, the Chairman of the "Soviet Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, pointed out that the United States proposals for control over armaments were aimed

"at discovering all our arsenals of national security, that is, at throwing open the door to a system of intelligence and espionage so as to facilitate the task of a potential aggressor."

The so-called "zonal inspection" measures envisaged in the United States plan also pursue the obvious aim of ascertaining the exact deployment of the Soviet nuclear missile system. And in this case, to use the expression of the Americans themselves, the reconnaissance tail wags the policy dog.

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Western statesmen and military and public figures have on more than one occasion spoken of the interest of the Western Powers in obtaining information of this kind. For example, the well-known English scientist Mr. Blackett, in his book Studies of War, wrote that the United States bases itself on the false thesis that its security can be maintained only if it has sufficient information on the location of Soviet nuclear installations to make possible a successful, sudden, and therefore aggressive nuclear attack on the Soviet nuclear delivery system. In other words, writes Mr. Blackett, the United States is apparently planning for the possibility of delivering the first preventive strike.

Direct reference to this was also made by Mr. Kissinger, adviser to the President of the United States on problems of strategy, when he wrote in Foreign Affairs in July 1962 that for the strategy of the counter-strike to be in any way successful it is necessary to know in advance the location of the targets. Many delegations here in the Committee have pointed out the dangerous character of the United States proposals for selective zonal inspection. In this connexion I should like to recall a statement by today's Chairman, our Swedish colleague Baron von Platen, who in an analysis of the disarmament control system said:

"The United States delegation, however, may ask why I do not envisage right from the beginning some application of the ingenious zonal inspection plan. In short, my answer is that I doubt the advisability of introducing such methods during our very first steps on the road to disarmament as they seem to imply some risk of not fulfilling the criteria dealing with non-divulgence of military secrets which are legally admissible." (ENDC/FV.71.p.32)

Such are the considerations on control which the Soviet delegation wished to express in connexion with the discussion of our proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed number of missiles until the end of stage II of disarmament. We could in fact have limited our remarks to this, had it not been for one strange argument which the Western Powers put forward in support of their position. At the meetings of 3 and 17 April the representatives of the Western Powers stated unanimously that the possibility of the concealment of a small number of delivery

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vehicles would be of no importance under the implementation of the Western plan, whereas it would radically upset the balance under the implementation of the Soviet plan.

Thus the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, asserted:

"Implementation of progressive across-the-board percentage cuts in all categories of major armaments as proposed in the United States plan would not require measures of total verification over the whole territory of States at the outset of the disarmament process".

(ENDC/FV.117, p.11)

Mr. Burns explained this by saying that if under implementation of the Western plan one of the States were to retain secretly a certain number of missiles or other means of attack, this would make no difference and security would not be jeopardized. What can we say about these assertions of Mr. Burns? First of all, this explanation of his contains the admission that under the United States disarmament plan States would have at their disposal such a huge quantity of armaments in the first and second stages of disarmament that the clandestine retention of missiles would have no importance and that there would therefore presumably be no incentive to engage in such retention. The conclusion is that the retention by States of huge quantities of armaments would be a good thing.

The Soviet proposals are a different matter. In considering them, the representatives of the Western Powers raise a good deal of clamour to the effect that the possibility of a State concealing even one missile or bomber would be very dangerous for the other States. Mr. Burns said that with a reciprocal obligation:

"If the weapons which were to be retained were few, clearly a very few concealed weapons could upset the balance." (ibid., p.12)

The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, availed himself of this question to revert to his favourite idea of control over all armaments throughout the territory of a country. He said:

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"Indeed the Soviet Union has disregarded the most important aspect of verification of agreed levels, namely, that there should be assurance that no armaments would be retained or produced clandestinely over and above the declared armaments subject to verification under the Soviet proposal". (ENDC/FV.121, p.24)

We reply, first of all, that the Western Powers admit the possibility of armaments being concealed in the event of their disarmament proposals being implemented. After all, their own plan is clearer to them.

But let us analyse the meaning of the Western Powers' objections. When their representatives speak of the possibility of the concealment of delivery vehicles, as a possible violator of the treaty in this regard they have in mind one of the great nuclear Powers -- either the Soviet Union or the United States and no one else. But if the representatives of the Western Powers give this twist to the subject, they obviously base themselves on the assumption that the great nuclear Power which decides to commit such a violation of the treaty as the concealment of delivery vehicles intends to attack another great nuclear Power and must take into account the risk of unleashing a war between the great nuclear Powers, that is a world war, and consequently must prepare for it. But it is not possible to carry out simultaneously two contradictory policies: to disarm, and to prepare for a world war -- and, moreover, to do so in profound secrecy.

It is precisely such a completely unrealistic, imaginary situation which the representatives of the Western Powers have in mind when they try to justify their objections to the Soviet proposal for the retention of a small number of missiles by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage of disarmament.

Thus a sober analysis tells us that the concealment of a small number of delivery vehicles, even if this should take place, would certainly not give an aggressor any certainty of success. It is obvious that without such a certainty an aggressor would not unleash a war. The point is that in order to obtain a decisive advantage from the concealment of weapons subject to destruction, it would be necessary to conceal not one, or even several, missiles, aircraft and other nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, but a large number of them. But the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles

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are by themselves insufficient. Everyone understands that a country which decided to go in for the clandestine retention of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would do so for the purpose of carrying out its aggressive military and strategic plans, the realization of which would be possible only in the event of the military defeat of the victim State.

But is it really possible in these days to achieve this aim with the retention of only a few concealed missiles or bombers? Anyone nursing plans for a military attack against a great nuclear Power would obviously count on gaining the victory and conquering the entire territory of the victim of his aggression otherwise his victory would not be complete. But this would require occupation of the territory and the establishment of military and political control, which, of course, would not be possible without very large, I would say immense, armed forces and immense quantities of weapons of the most modern type.

Therefore, if a State were to conceal a certain number of missiles or bombers, it would not gain anything thereby, since it could not wage a war, let alone win it, with such limited means. To do so would require large armies equipped with the most modern weapons, and it is precisely these that would be completely destroyed under the Soviet proposal. Furthermore, the armed forces themselves would be radically reduced to the level of 1,900,000 men for the Soviet Union and for the United States. Moreover, we must also take into account the fact that the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provides for very strict measures of control which, being in keeping with the disarmament measures, are so extensive and diversified as to preclude any practical possibility of concealing any nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Any such attempt on the part of anyone would be quickly exposed.

I draw your attention to the fact that any preparation for a war after the implementation of the measures for the first stage of disarmament envisaged by the Soviet draft treaty would be impossible. Anyone wishing to embark on such a course would have to begin by re-building large armed forces and ultra-modern armaments, and that, of course, would not go undetected by the international control

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body. Any State deciding to embark upon this course would be immediately exposed as a violator of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. As you see, the strange situations described to us by the representatives of the Western Powers exist only in their imaginations. The artificiality, the unreality of these situations is obvious.

Thus the Western Powers have no really serious, well-founded or convincing arguments against the Soviet proposal for the destruction in the very first stage of disarmament of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons. However, for the sake of achieving an agreement as quickly as possible the Soviet Union went even further to meet the views of the Western Powers. Under the Soviet proposal a small and strictly limited number of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the second stage of disarmament would provide an additional guarantee of security in case, as the nuclear Powers fear, someone should violate the treaty and secretly retain a certain number of means of attack. The missiles to be retained under the Soviet proposal would be that deterrent which would make completely pointless any attempt to retain, in violation of the treaty, missiles or other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, including bombers. They would be destroyed in any case by the anti-missile and anti-aircraft weapons remaining at the disposal of States, if the party which concealed them should contemplate carrying out aggression.

The Soviet proposal would create a situation which a party contemplating violation of the agreement would not be able to ignore. It would realize that the concealment of missiles and the violation of its obligations under the treaty would not bring it any success and would not go unpunished. That is the fundamental difference between the Soviet proposals and the Western plan; that is the basic and decisive advantage of the former.

The representatives of the Western Powers point out as a defect of the Soviet proposal the fact that we do not name a specific figure for the missiles to be retained. We regard this, not as a defect, but as a positive aspect of our proposal, for the following reason.

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Article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament states that in the first stage:

"All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage. A strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses ... shall also be retained." (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.5)

I hope that the representatives of the Western Powers understand that the words "agreed and strictly limited number of ... missiles" are not pure coincidence. They mean first of all that the number of missiles to be retained must be strictly limited, that is, minimal; and secondly that this strictly limited number must be agreed upon between us. This means that the figures for the missiles to be retained by each side are by no means purely arbitrary quantities; these figures must be the subject of an agreement. We have already explained why we propose that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a strictly limited number of missiles until the end of the second stage. The main, indeed, the sole, purpose of the Soviet proposal for the destruction in the first stage of disarmament of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war which is now hanging over mankind.

The Government of the United States categorically objected to this proposal of the Soviet Union, saying that after the beginning of disarmament States would still need for some time a "defensive umbrella" -- I am using the terminology used by the Western Powers. We do not consider these arguments justified, but in order to move the cause of disarmament out of the impasse and to start a real movement forward, the Soviet Union agreed that with the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles

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in stage I an exception should be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global — that is, intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft defence missiles in the "ground-to-air" category. These remaining missiles would be retained only by the Soviet Union and the United States and would be kept exclusively in their own territories. This Soviet proposal takes into account the position of the Western Powers, since it provides that for a certain time — that is, until the end of stage II — some defensive weapons would be retained in case someone, as some Western statesmen fear, should decide during the process of disarmament to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or military aircraft.

Thus the basic principle, the basic criterion, which we propose as a guide in determining the number of missiles to be retained is that this number should be strictly limited to a minimum, so that no one should be tempted to use these missiles for the purpose of carrying out aggressive designs and so that by reason of their strictly limited number they could not serve the purposes of war, the purposes of aggression. At the same time the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a strictly limited number of missiles would in fact make pointless any attempt to conceal a few missiles or bombers, since in these days they would be insufficient to wage a war, let alone win it. Consequently the unwarranted fears expressed here by the representatives of the Western Powers that the concealment of a few missiles or bombers might provide an incentive to unleash aggression are artificial, far-fetched and unfounded. These fears cannot be considered as a serious argument against the Soviet proposal.

Equally unfounded is the other argument of the Western Powers against the Soviet proposal to the effect that they cannot define their position in principle with regard to it because the Soviet Union has not named the specific number of missiles to be retained. We have already shown the weakness of this argument of the Western Powers and the advantage of our approach to the solution of this question. No one who really desires serious negotiations on this matter can object to our proposal that we should first come to an understanding on the principle — that is,

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on the principle serving as the basis of an agreement, on the criteria to be used as a guide in determining the number of missiles to be retained. Afterwards, on the basis of this agreement in principle, on the basis of the criteria the two sides will easily be able to reach agreement on the specific number of global — that is, intercontinental — missiles, anti-missile missiles and ground-to-air missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States.

It seems to us that such an approach would immediately bring our negotiations on this question into a practical channel. In this way we should avoid a stage of sterile controversies on the number of missiles to be retained. If there is no previous understanding on the basic principle of such an agreement, it is to be foreseen that one side, for example, will have in mind figures of one or two digits and the other side figures of three or even four digits for the number of missiles to be retained. This is precisely what may be expected from the United States side, whose representatives would like to elucidate by way of comparison the specific difference between this Soviet proposal and the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage.

This means that the proposals of the two sides would be so far apart that any agreement on the number of missiles to be retained would be unthinkable. Take, for example, the lamentable experience of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, where only a few units, for instance, in the question of the number of control posts or inspections were a sufficient pretext for the Western Powers to block agreement. It would be another matter if we were to agree beforehand on the basic principle, on the criteria to be used as a guide in determining the number of missiles to be retained. In these circumstances there should be no great difference between the specific proposals of either side on the number of missiles to be retained, since both sides would be guided by the same criteria in determining these numbers and would base themselves on the same basic principle. As a result, the figures proposed by both sides should be fairly close to each other and may even coincide. In any case, in these circumstances the process of agreeing the number of missiles to be retained would be incomparably easier.

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As you see, this analysis shows that the approach proposed by the Soviet Union to the solution of this question is logical and realistic and can easily be carried out in practice. We call upon our Western partners to come to an agreement without delay on the matter of principle, and then proceed to a discussion of the specific numbers of missiles of various types and categories to be retained on the basis of the agreed principle, the agreed criterion. Such an agreement would entail substantial progress in our negotiations. We call upon the Western Powers to respond to this initiative of the Soviet Union and to make their contribution to the cause of disarmament.

If we take the United States Outline of Basic Provisions for a Treaty, any concealment of weapons during its implementation would constitute a definite danger to the others. Let us examine this question. Under the Western proposals for a percentage reduction of armaments, the States would retain not only their armed forces but also nuclear weapons and means of delivery throughout the process of disarmament. This means that the danger of a nuclear war would constantly hang over mankind. And those in the Pentagon and in the NATO general staffs who are now working out plans for military operations would have every possibility of unleashing a full-scale war. In these circumstances, any concealed quantity of missiles or other strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons would constitute a reserve for a potential aggressor, which would, of course, provide an additional incentive to unleash a world-wide thermonuclear war.

Those are the considerations which the Soviet delegation wished to put forward at today's meeting. As for the other questions raised by the representatives of the Western countries in connexion with our proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed number of missiles until the end of the second stage of disarmament, we should like to reserve the right to revert to them at our next meeting devoted to the problems of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened carefully to the statement which the representative of the Soviet Union has just made. He has gone over a number of arguments which he has previously put to the Conference in favour of the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union delegation for dealing with the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles (ENDC/2/Rev.1, articles 5-8). We shall, of course, study his remarks with care, and we may make some observations on them at a future meeting.

The only point which I should like to make at present in that connexion is that the Soviet delegation does not appear to have grasped the essence of the argument which my delegation advanced at a previous meeting (ENDC/PV.129, pp.5 et seq.), pointing out the rather critical nature of the numbers of retained vehicles if the Soviet Union's proposals were adopted. However, I do not propose to refer to that further at this meeting; I propose, rather, to speak on a more general topic which I think has a very important relation to our proceedings here.

At our meeting on Friday last, 10 May, the representative of the Soviet Union quoted Mr. Stelle, the representative of the United States, and went on with further observations of his own which I should like to put on the record again. Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, said:

'Our responsibilities require also that we understand each other's concerns and try to meet those concerns in a manner consistent with the common security.' (ENDC/PV.127, p.29)

"Those are very good words; they are full of good sense.

"We have just stated our views, our fears and apprehensions with regard to the policy of military balance which the Western Powers are pursuing. We ask the United States delegation and the representatives of the other Western Powers to recognize their responsibility and show comprehension of these fears and apprehensions, which are perturbing not only the socialist countries but also all peace-loving peoples." (ENDC/PV.130, p.40)

So far the Canadian delegation can endorse what Mr. Tsarapkin said, and even endorse it enthusiastically. But he went on to put all the blame for the dangerous confrontations in the world on the Western alliance, and of course we cannot agree

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to that. His remarks made me think of some passages in a book called An Alternative to War or Surrender, by Charles E. Osgood, who is Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois. With the Committee's permission I should like to quote the following extracts from his book:

"The proposals that have been presented by both the USSR and the United States for general and complete disarmament are actually quite similar."

And here I might interpolate that the Canadian delegation has pointed out before in this Committee the similarities in approach which have been effected through negotiations. I quote further from Professor Osgood's book:

"There are differences, to be sure -- in the types of inspection, in the organization and authority of the international control body and so forth -- but there would seem to be nothing so serious as to rule out the possibility of successful negotiation."

However, as we in this Committee know all too well, reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament through negotiations seems a rather distant prospect. The Professor asks why that is so, and he gives the answer:

"When both sides agree on the extraordinary danger created by the existence of nuclear weapons, when both sides express earnest (and, I believe, sincere) desires for peace, when both sides agree reasonably well on how to go about it, why are they unable to get together? What are the mechanisms in human thinking under conflict conditions that work against successful negotiation?

"What one side perceives as equable (fair, balanced, just) is likely to be perceived by the other as inequable (unfair, unbalanced, unjust). Given their quite different national histories, Russians and Americans approach negotiations with different sets of meaning for the same critical concepts: 'inspection' means espionage for one but elimination of secrecy for the other; 'overseas bases' means aggressive intent to one but defensive intent to the other -- and so on ad infinitum."

I might remark in passing that the Professor cites Russians and Americans, but I think that if he could attend our discussions here he would probably conclude that all their allies exhibit much the same characteristics, the Canadian delegation included of course.

A good part of the Soviet representative's statement at our 130th meeting, from which I have quoted, described the apprehensions of the USSR and its allies. He invited the Western nations to take them into account in our policies for defence and

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in our proposals for disarmament and measures preliminary to disarmament. The Canadian delegation agrees that we should do so. But we think also that the Soviet Union delegation and the delegations of its allies should be aware of how the Soviet Union proposals for the first stage of disarmament, and its proposed declaration (ENDC/75) that no means of delivery of nuclear weapons should be stationed on foreign bases, look to the NATO members, and that they should give due consideration to that and perhaps modify their proposals to bring them more into accord with the agreed principle of balance (ENDC/5, para.5).

At our meeting of 24 April, during which we discussed general and complete disarmament Western representatives were accused by Mr. Tsarapkin (ENDC/PV.124, pp.12 et seq.) of failing to give a clear-cut reply whether or not they accepted the Soviet disarmament plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1) as amended by the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127.provisional, p.38-40). He accused the Western representatives of posing questions which aimed at confusing the real issue, and said that the very nature of the questions posed amounted, in his view, to a rejection of the Soviet proposal. That, of course, is not the case. We have made an honest attempt to examine Soviet proposals for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the context of other stage I measures proposed by the Soviet Union. When we seek more light on how the Soviet proposals would affect the security of Western States, we are accused of clouding the issue and of distorting the effect which the Soviet proposals would have on what I shall now term, in deference to the Polish representative, "the balance of security".

The factors which affect a nation's security are many, and they vary from one country to another, but there is one common approach: the defensive measures taken are governed by the threats which they are intended to counter. To tell the West, as Mr. Tsarapkin is prone to do, that we are securing ourselves against an imaginary threat is not enough to persuade us to accept the Soviet disarmament plan. We must be shown that that plan will not break up the co-ordinated defensive dispositions which together form the safeguard against what we believe to be the threat confronting us.

I do not wish to initiate a polemical debate about who threatens whom. It is obvious that both major military alliances consider themselves threatened. However, I should like to state briefly what I consider to be the main objection from a Western point of view to the first stage of the Soviet draft disarmament plan. It is that NATO, as a defensive alliance, would be broken up completely under the terms of the Soviet first-stage measures. That would be so even if those measures were implemented with verification considered adequate by the West, and even if, taking the statistics

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of manpower and armaments of the separate NATO nations and adding them together, the sum were approximately equal to the corresponding statistics for States members of the Warsaw Pact bloc.

Why does the Canadian delegation hold that view? In the first place, if the Soviet Union first-stage disarmament plan were adopted, all forces and armaments would be confined within their national boundaries. No headquarters to co-ordinate the defensive efforts of member States could function, and no joint exercises could be undertaken. If the North Atlantic alliance is effective today, it is because the defensive capabilities of all members have been brought together under an international chain of command.

The second major objection we see is that all military forces of the major partner in NATO would be 3,000 miles away from Europe -- across the Atlantic -- and the peripheral members of the alliance in Europe, such as Norway, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey, would be separated from the geographical hub of the alliance by other natural barriers. The Soviet representative criticizes our references to those geographical considerations as artificial, meaningless and irrelevant. It may be possible, as Mr. Tsarapkin told us on 24 April (ENDC/PV.124, p.14) to transport a division of troops from the North American continent to Europe in a matter of nine, or even seven, hours; but what would be produced by implementing the first stage of the Soviet plan is a military situation similar in many respects to that which existed at the beginning of the Second World War. In that war the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada had considerable experience of moving troops to Europe from across the Atlantic and in mounting invasions across the Mediterranean and the Channel. The time taken to transport troops with only their packs and rifles -- and that is the time which would be referred to in the conditions possible to air transport -- is by no means a measure of the time it takes to bring to bear the effective military force of a nation which is geographically removed from the battle area.

I suppose it is natural that the socialist countries, in their endeavour to convince the Conference that their plan is realistic and our objections illogical, should try to minimize those factors which would clearly enhance their military power relative to that of NATO. Let us reflect for a moment on what would be the position of some NATO countries if the alliance were dismembered, as the Soviet first-stage plan would have it. Let us consider, for example, the defensive position of European member countries situated on the flanks of the treaty area. They would still be associated with the rest of their allies by a paper treaty. In practice, however, if they were subjected to external military or political pressure, or threatened with it,

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their NATO allies who had complied with the requirements of the Soviet first-stage proposals would be unable to give them timely and effective support. The fact is that at the end of its first stage the Soviet Union would continue to dispose of the most powerful single military force in Western Europe, a force very much greater than any other there, and would be faced only by individual nations which would have lost the means of co-ordinating their separate forces into a combined defence.

The influences and fears which led to the establishment of NATO still operate, and while they do it cannot be expected that the Western nations will return to the vulnerable position in which they found themselves in 1949. It might help the socialist delegations to understand our position better if they were to consider whether they would feel very secure if the Soviet Union were separated from the rest of the Warsaw Pact nations by an ocean 3,000 miles wide. I think they would reach much the same conclusions as those which underlie the conceptions of the United States Outline of Basic Provisions for a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/30).

To the remarks I have made I anticipate that the Soviet representative might answer something like this: "The socialist States threaten no one. The effect of the first stage of our disarmament proposals not only would eliminate manpower and armaments in equal proportion, so that no State or group of States gained an advantage, but also would abolish the possibility of nuclear war for all time in two years and would create an atmosphere in which military alliances would have no valid reason to exist."

To that I would reply: We have disagreed with the Soviet Union's contention that its plan would be sure to abolish nuclear warfare, and we have explained why. First, to turn back the clock eighteen years, as the Soviet proposal purports to do, would not make the world a safer place for mankind, because we cannot turn back the clock of knowledge. We have learnt the means of waging thermonuclear war, and unless we contemplate as a first-stage measure of disarmament the elimination of all scientists and technicians capable of re-establishing the art of nuclear war, the danger of escalation will always exist. Secondly, history teaches us -- and I mean all the countries represented here -- that nations cannot rely solely on fair words promising peace and friendship uttered by any nation that has military power to enforce its policies.

That is not simply a negative position, simply a refusal to contemplate disarmament. We in the Western group of nations believe we offer an alternative and more feasible plan; and what the Western countries ask is that the Soviet delegation should give the same thoughtful consideration to the Western plan as the West has given to the Soviet

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proposals. Would a 30 per cent reduction of armaments across the board, and the concurrent effect that would have on armaments and manpower extraterritorially deployed now, not create a situation far preferable to the one which exists today? As I have said previously, while it is not claimed that the putting into effect of the first stage proposals of the United States and its allies would render the world safe forever from the danger of war, it would put an end to the arms race and make the world a far safer place than it now is.

I have tried today to give a brief appraisal of what would be the most important effect of the Soviet proposals on the security of the members of the North Atlantic alliance. If the socialist countries feel that the Western plan would lessen their security, we should be glad to hear their explanation of why and how it would do so. We want to hear something closer to realities than such one-sentence arguments as "Abolish the means of waging nuclear war for all time in two years", and "Foreign bases are imperialistic and threaten the Soviet Union and its socialist allies". I rather dignify those statements by calling them arguments, of course, but they are statements which we have heard repeated very frequently. What we should like instead is a constructive analysis of our proposals, including a clear statement whether, in the opinion of the socialist delegations, they do or do not observe the principle of balance; and we would hope that that would bring about eventually the desired meeting of minds

Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French) My delegation considers that whenever we broach the disarmament problem we are obliged -- we should feel obliged -- not to forget that our objective is founded on certain generally-accepted principles and premises. "Generally-accepted" here means that they have been accepted by governments and approved by the United Nations and enjoy the strongest support of world public opinion, of all peoples united on the matter by a unanimous will and desire.

The first of these principles is that in our time disarmament is an absolute necessity in order to ensure not only peace but the very survival of mankind. Each one of us could quote an impressive number of dramatic statements and appeals confirming what I have just said. I shall therefore confine myself to recalling what I think is the most recent of these documents: the Declaration published in Geneva by the members

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of the International Scientific Community and circulated by the kind offices of the Brazilian representative at our Conference, Mr. de Castro. More than 150 scientists from different countries express in this document their conviction that all peoples should do their utmost to support the idea of general and complete disarmament.

Secondly, it is recognized that with the advent of the atomic era we can no longer speak of disarmament without first considering the need to avert and eliminate the threat and danger of nuclear war. The basic disarmament problem at the present time is that of eliminating the danger of nuclear war. This is the danger which lends the disarmament problem an urgency that we can never disregard.

This is what President Kennedy said on the subject in an address at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961:

"Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation, or by madness ... The mere existence of modern weapons --- ten million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth --- is a source of horror and discord and distrust."

(A/PV.1013, paragraphs 50, 51)

The question therefore inevitably arises of the means to be adopted to escape from this situation. Unfortunately there are not many. In fact there is only one, since, by the very nature of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, the nuclear danger can be eliminated only if radical measures are taken to render them harmless from the start of the disarmament process. Consequently there are only two ways of radically solving this problem: the direct method, which consists in banning and eliminating nuclear weapons in the first stage, and the indirect method, which consists in neutralizing these fearsome weapons, that is to say in destroying all means of delivering them -- the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

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I feel very embarrassed at having to repeat such well-known facts; but I am really obliged to do so because at the present stage of discussion on the proposal made by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40), it is essential to review certain questions and in particular to clarify the respective attitudes of the nuclear Powers towards the nuclear problem.

The Soviet Union's attitude is well known. The Soviet Government and the Soviet delegation have more than once drawn attention to the danger of nuclear weapons and the urgent need to eliminate that danger. In this connexion the Soviet Union -- which has always been concerned to find an adequate solution -- bearing in mind the objections raised by the West, proposed the use of one or other of the two methods I have just mentioned. We all know the reception the Soviet proposals were given: they were rejected. The United States, supported by the United Kingdom, rejected the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons in the first stage. They also rejected the proposal in the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2, art. 5) to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament.

The attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom is also well known, particularly since, in this respect as in many others, it has remained fixed. It consists in proposing (ENDC/30) a 30 per cent reduction in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage, a further 35 per cent reduction during the second stage, and yet another reduction, also of 35 per cent, during a third stage. It should be noted at once that no time-limit has been fixed for carrying out these reductions; but they will obviously take a very long time.

Attempts have been made during our discussion -- and at great length -- to present this method as offering great advantages. But the authors of these proposals have said nothing about the fact that a 30 per cent reduction in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles does not reduce the danger and threat of nuclear aggression by the same 30 per cent. In other words, despite reductions of 30 per cent, and of 35 per cent in the second stage, the threat and the danger will still be 100 per cent, so that the effect of the reduction will always be nil; hence there will be no effective disarmament, since in our age no genuine disarmament is conceivable without eliminating the nuclear threat and danger.

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It has been said that the United States plan, while not entirely eliminating the danger of nuclear war, would nevertheless have the effect of reducing that danger. That is a misconception; the danger cannot disappear unless it disappears altogether; it cannot be eliminated piecemeal. It may of course be thought that, as we have often heard said here, the nuclear danger will always exist; but it cannot be asserted that the danger will be lessened by a 30 per cent reduction in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

Here I think we touch on one of the greatest difficulties of our task, due to this fundamental contradiction between, on the one hand, the reality created by nuclear weapons, by the ever-growing manifold danger of nuclear catastrophe, and the urgent need to put an end to this desperate situation, and on the other hand the negative attitude of the Western countries. While seeking to conceal the substance of the problem by inadequate proposals such as 30 per cent reductions spread over an indefinite period of time, the Western representatives maintain that the nuclear threat is one means -- and in their view the most reliable means -- of guaranteeing peace and security.

In other words, the United States and their allies do not merely oppose the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; they invoke the present existence of these weapons and their retention for an indefinite period in the future as essential to peace. Thus the most terrible threats that have ever hung over the world become, in the Western representatives' arguments, a bulwark of peace. So that the major concern of the United States will no longer be the need to eliminate nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, but becomes the need to keep them indefinitely and hence to increase their destructive power and the efficiency of their means of delivery, which is the consequence of the arms race.

The statements of the United States and the other Western representatives during the discussion are in this respect highly significant. I must say in all fairness that theirs has been an extremely arduous task, since it is impossible not to recognize the seriousness of the danger and no less impossible to prove that this same danger should be preserved.

I have already ventured to quote President Kennedy on the subject of the nuclear threat. May I quote again, this time from the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Mark, at the meeting held on 3 April? He then said:

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"It is not at all evident why the communist countries think that they alone appreciate the disaster for humanity that would arise from a nuclear war, and that they alone are anxious and ready to prevent that disaster. We in the West are just as aware of that supreme political challenge of our era as are our Eastern colleagues." (ENDC/PV.117, p.18)

This, in my view, is very well spoken, although I do not see why Mr. Mark should have said that the representatives of the socialist countries think that they alone are capable of appreciating the danger. I do not think that anyone has ever said so. What any representative of a socialist country is bound to say is that it is not enough to appreciate the danger, but the right steps must be taken to avert it and to eliminate it for ever. We cannot help noting the contradictions between the statements appreciating the nuclear danger and the military measures that will increase that danger by disseminating nuclear weapons and weapon delivery vehicles all over the world. Nor can we fail to note the contradiction in arguing that in order to save the world from the nuclear threat all you have to do is to maintain that same threat. No; we believe that it is simpler, and also more logical, to seek ways and means of eliminating the threat. What we say is that the attitude of the United States to the problem of the nuclear threat is based on the desire to retain nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and thus to keep the threat of nuclear war hanging over our heads.

But the attitude of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to this crucial problem is quite different. It is in complete harmony with popular feeling and the refusal of mankind to live in a nuclear nightmare. In a word, we are in favour of the total and immediate elimination of the nuclear threat.

The search for a solution of the problem along the lines of the Soviet proposals does not stem from an over-simplified "maximalism", as is sometimes hinted by the Western delegations but from the very nature of modern weapons and their terrible power of destruction. And it is with due regard to the nature of nuclear weapons and to the new reality they have created that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries raise the question of eliminating the threat they represent, while naturally allowing for the other elements that go to make up the very complex problem of disarmament.

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The last proposal made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, has been amply commented upon at previous meetings of the Committee. It is in essence, as the Soviet Union representative has said, an important initiative offering concessions to the United States. How did the Western delegations receive the Gromyko proposal? By already familiar tactics. They first expressed some interest in it and said they regarded it as a step in the right direction. Then shortly afterwards they began to put a series of questions designed to elicit so-called "clarifications", and next asked for subsequent concessions by the Soviet Union and made concerted attempts to show that the Gromyko proposal is no more than an adoption of the Western position on the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles. We have seen the same tactics used many times.

In July last, when the Soviet Union accepted the Western proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of conventional weapons in the first stage, (ENDC/PV.57, pp. 21 et seq.), the immediate reaction of the Western delegations (ibid., p.37) was to describe that concession as an important step by the Soviet Union. The next reaction (ENDC/PV.59, pp.16 et seq.) was: now that the Soviet Union has accepted that principle for conventional weapons, why not extend it to other weapons, including nuclear weapon vehicles?

. Thus, every new step taken by the Soviet delegation to meet the Western delegations is greeted with an attempt to express everything in terms of American ideas and to fit any new proposal into the narrow framework of the plan submitted by the United States.

Although such attempts may have the merit of prolonging discussion, they naturally cannot produce any positive result. In this particular case it is easy to see that there is not and never can be any connexion between the Gromyko proposal and the United States proposals for a percentage reduction in vehicles. In the first place, the substance of the problem remains unchanged -- and the substance of the Soviet proposal lies in a solution which, in regard to nuclear weapon vehicles, would provide qualitative changes in the present situation, whereas the United States proposal provides only for a quantitative approach. The Gromyko proposal attacks the problem always with a view to a rapid elimination of the nuclear threat by the liquidation and destruction of all missiles that may be used as nuclear weapon vehicles, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, ground-to-air missiles and anti-missile missiles which the Soviet Union and the United States

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would retain until the end of the second stage solely within their own territories (ENDC/2/Rev.1, arts 5-8). What has that to do with the 30 per cent reduction in the first stage?

The Soviet proposal provides that only an agreed, but strictly limited, number of vehicles would be retained in the territories of two countries only, the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet proposal introduces, as always, the time factor, and lays down specific time-limits for carrying out the agreed measures.

If the Gromyko proposals were carried out, would the situation be really the same as the present one, or as that which would obtain after a 30 per cent reduction?

These are the observations which I think had to be made at this stage of the discussion. I apologize for having had to repeat some very well-known facts; but, since the Western delegations assert that they are aware of and concerned about the seriousness of the nuclear danger, I think they should answer one question that is still pending despite the scope of the discussion. In our opinion, that question is the following: Does the United States see a threat in the present state of nuclear weapons? If so, is there in the United States delegation's opinion an urgent necessity to eliminate it; and how and when, under the United States proposals, could this threat be eliminated?

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): At our plenary meeting on 8 May a number of delegations, including my own, suggested that the time may have come when we should proceed to the discussion of the next item on our agreed agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) and refer items 5(b) and 5(c) to the co-Chairmen for further consideration and subsequent report to the Committee. As my delegation indicated at that meeting (ENDC/PV.129, p.33) and as has been further demonstrated by statements from our Eastern colleagues this morning, we obviously have still a long way to go to achieve agreement on the reduction of armaments in stage I. The United States proposals on the subject have been presented in considerable detail, and we have also submitted appropriate draft treaty language which is before the Committee (ENDC/69).

The United States delegation has also, as was noted by our Soviet colleague this morning (supra, p.6), put forward its preliminary conclusions (ENDC/PV.124, pp. 32 et seq) on the proposals of the Soviet Union for reduction of armaments in stage I (ENDC/2/Rev.1), including the modification of those proposals made in the General Assembly last autumn by Foreign Minister Gromyko (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40). Those preliminary conclusions were based, as we said at the time, on admittedly inadequate data and

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information from the Soviet representatives on just what their proposals mean. This morning's statement by the Soviet representative has not, unfortunately, added further to our information. We are still awaiting from the Soviet delegation sufficient clarification and elaboration of its proposals on items 5(b) and 5(c), and we remain hopeful that our Soviet colleagues will in due course provide us with such information.

Today, however, my delegation intends to proceed to the next item on our agenda, with the proviso, of course, as we have said earlier, that items 5(b) and 5(c) be further discussed by the two co-Chairmen and, at a later date, in the Committee as well.

Item 5(d) of our agreed agenda is, of course, concerned with measures in the field of nuclear disarmament in stage I and with related measures of effective control. In my statement today I intend to discuss the proposals of the United States which deal with those measures and their effective control.

The philosophy of the United States disarmament plan (ENDC/30), as will be recalled, involves a freezing of armaments at a point in time and their gradual, progressive and balanced reduction to zero. The United States has proposed four major measures to accomplish this task with respect to nuclear disarmament in stage I.

First, the arms race in nuclear weapons production would be stopped through a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

Second, reduction in nuclear stockpiles would begin through transfers of meaningful quantities of weapons-grade U-235 to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons.

Third, States would undertake obligations with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Fourth, nuclear weapons technology would be frozen with a test ban, which of course we fervently hope will soon be agreed upon and put into effect as the first step in this area, even before we have reached agreement on broader arrangements.

While those four measures are being implemented experts should, we propose, study the ways of assuring the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

The first of these United States proposals calls for a halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. That means that States would cease, at the beginning of stage I, all production of U-235 and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. To that end the parties to the treaty would submit, through the international disarmament organization, a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date, as well as the amounts and types of fissionable material produced at each such facility. That means that States in the

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first stage would be declaring only those installations within their boundaries involved in the process of making fissionable materials. Other installations involved in the production of nuclear weapons and their storage, and hence concerned with certain vital national security interests, would not, under our proposal, need to be declared at that early point in the disarmament process. Principally, the declaration would involve certain production and other reactors, gaseous diffusion plants, and other subordinate and complementary installations used in the production of plutonium and U-235.

The United States proposals provide also that the production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The parties to the treaty would submit to the international disarmament organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable materials which were being produced at each facility.

Obviously, there will have to be some production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. That means, under our proposals, that States will be allowed to continue to produce materials necessary, for example, in the production of power, in medicine, and for scientific research. But there will have to be some means to ensure that materials produced for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons do not find their way into nuclear weapons. Consequently, under our proposals States will have to subject themselves to very strict accountability with respect to fissionable materials production.

We might note, however, that the United States proposals, as we have just said, are not intended to prevent the production and the use of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes to whatever extent States may wish to engage in such activities. However, efforts to ensure adequate control over those materials would require that production be regulated at some agreed level and that all such materials be carefully accounted for. This point is, of course, very important, because fissionable materials are easily converted for use in weapons, and States should therefore have an obligation under the terms of any agreement to limit their production to levels which would satisfy their peaceful requirements and to provide assurances to the rest of the world that such materials were not diverted to weapons purposes. In this connexion, the United States proposals provide also for the use of safeguards for international transfers of nuclear materials.

As to the actual verification of the implementation of the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials, the United States has proposed that, in accordance with agreed arrangements, the international disarmament organization would verify the

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implementation of this measure at declared facilities and also provide assurances that activities subject to agreed limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

The first portion of the verification problem with regard to the cut-off -- verification that declared facilities were producing only what they were supposed to produce -- could be handled in a number of ways. Each of the arrangements would require further study; but my delegation believes the Committee might consider any one of them from the point of view of its adequacy to ensure that declared plant production was not exceeding the agreed level.

As an illustrative example, it might be possible to verify a plant's activities without entering the confines of the plant itself. That might be done, for example, by looking at a plant's electrical consumption and water usage, and by external monitoring of stack gases and of the input and output of materials processed by the plant. On the other hand, it may, after study, prove to be necessary, to prevent diversions within agreed tolerances, to enter all or a portion of certain plants.

The first type of verification arrangements might well be suitable to ensure that plants which had been completely shut down were indeed not operating; but more stringent measures might be required for operating plants. My delegation does not favour any one system over another, nor are we proposing a particular system of inspection; we are merely setting forth these two examples as illustrations of some of the possibilities for adequate verification of a cut-off.

With regard to the second portion of the control process -- arrangements to ensure that prohibited activities were not conducted at undeclared or clandestine facilities -- the United States is prepared to explore such arrangements as would provide the necessary assurances while safeguarding the security of the States concerned.

The second major measure of the United States proposal provides for the transfer of significant, agreed quantities of weapons-grade fissionable material to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Let there be no mistake about the effect of a transfer of a significant quantity of U.235 of weapons-grade quality to non-weapons uses. Coupled with the cut-off of production of such material, any transfer of such material, regardless of whether the material came from weapons themselves or from the pipeline, would affect directly the size of nuclear stockpiles and would consequently represent an important measure of nuclear disarmament.

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As our United Kingdom colleague pointed out in his very excellent statement on this subject on 7 September 1962 (ENDC/PV.82, p.37), what makes a nuclear weapon a device of mass destruction is not its size or shape, or its electronic or mechanical components, but the simple fact that it contains fissionable materials. Once transferred to non-weapons purposes and reprocessed as might be necessary, under effective safeguards, such material would no longer be available for use in nuclear weapons.

My delegation has affirmed in the past, and reaffirms once again, its belief that significant transfer of nuclear material, in connexion with a cut-off of production, would be the best means of getting the large nuclear stockpiles now in the hands of certain States reduced at the earliest possible time. My delegation believes also that States should have discretion concerning whether the materials to be transferred would come from weapons already produced or from material stockpiled for eventual production of weapons. We believe that such a flexible arrangement would clearly facilitate the implementation and verification of this measure; whereas, on the other hand, specific provision that material should come from weapons already existing would greatly complicate the matter by raising, among other things, the very difficult problem of revealing, at the very beginning of the disarmament process, weapons design.

Thus the United States proposal avoids arrangements which would necessitate revelation at the very outset of the disarmament process of matters which are closely-guarded State secrets and which vitally concern national security. Of course, the United States proposal would involve verification of the amount and of the quality of the material transferred; but such verification should not in any way involve disclosure of any particularly sensitive information.

My delegation firmly believes that these two measures -- a cut-off of the production of materials for weapons purposes, combined with the transfer of significant quantities of U-235 to non-weapons purposes -- would be a very important step towards our goal of eliminating the stocks of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States. Naturally, transfer alone without a simultaneous cut-off would not be meaningful, since production to replace transferred material could continue. For that reason the United States links the two proposals.

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As for the quantity of the material to be transferred, the Committee is aware of the United States proposal for transfer by the United States and the Soviet Union of 50,000 kilogrammes each of weapons-grade U-235 to non-weapons purposes. At the same time, the United States has stated on several occasions that it is flexible about that amount. If the Soviet Union, for some reason, believes that the amounts for transfer proposed by the United States are unsatisfactory, the United States is prepared to consider, within reason, such amounts as the Soviet Union may wish to propose.

A key point in the United States proposals for nuclear disarmament measures in stage I is that fissionable materials transferred to peaceful uses, either within a State or to another State, would be subject to a system of safeguards. The United States proposals provide that the fissionable materials transferred could be used by the State to which the materials belonged in any manner it saw fit, including transfer to other States, provided only that they were not diverted to nuclear weapons use. To ensure that the materials are not so diverted, the United States proposes that they be subject to safeguard procedures by the international disarmament organization. The exact modalities of any such procedures could be worked out in an annex on verification appended to the treaty.

Another major provision in the United States proposals relates to the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons to States which do not now manufacture or own such weapons. The United States proposals would ensure that stage I of the treaty contained adequate provisions for preventing (1) transfer of control of any nuclear weapons to States which had not manufactured such weapons, (2) assistance to such States in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, (3) testing of nuclear weapons by any State. In the cases of the transfer of control of nuclear weapons or assistance in manufacturing nuclear weapons, the United States proposals contain specific prohibitions which we would wish to see included in stage I of the treaty, or undertaken prior to the implementation of the treaty, if possible.

With regard to nuclear weapon test explosions, the United States hopes, and indeed assumes, that we shall have reached an effective and safeguarded test ban agreement well before stage I is put into effect, and we believe that such an agreement would open the way to measures dealing more directly with the problem of proliferation. But if, in spite of all our efforts and hopes, such an agreement is not arrived at, the United States position is that all nuclear weapon test explosions should be prohibited in stage I and that effective procedures for the verification of the cessation of such tests should be a part of the treaty.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The final point in the United States proposals for nuclear measures in stage I is the creation of a group of experts to discuss the means for settling and to settle outstanding questions relating to the future reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles in stages II and III.

The United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/60) submitted on 31 August last presents us with, among other things, some preliminary conclusions on the difficulties of checking past production of fissionable materials. At the moment we know that it would be very difficult to account for past fissionable materials production, and that therefore States which might be led to violate the treaty could have the possibility of successfully concealing nuclear weapons. We therefore believe that the best approach to the problem of the final complete elimination of nuclear weapons should be to attack and resolve jointly the technical issues surrounding the problem of verifying the elimination of those weapons. Such an approach, we believe, need not necessarily await the signature of a treaty. It could begin as soon as delegations felt themselves clearly prepared to undertake the necessary studies.

In summary, the United States proposals for nuclear measures in stage I would result in the following:

First: they would arrest the growth of nuclear stockpiles for use in weapons, through a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons;

Secondly: they would reduce the amount of fissionable materials available to States for use in nuclear weapons and thus reduce their nuclear weapon capabilities;

Thirdly: they would prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by agreements to prohibit the transfer of control of nuclear weapons to additional States and to prohibit assistance to additional States in manufacturing nuclear weapons; and

Fourthly: they would freeze the advance of nuclear weapons technology with an effective agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions, under adequate control.

The United States delegation believes that the implementation of those important measures would go far towards halting expansion of what we all know are the already stupendous nuclear capabilities available to certain Powers. We hope that the Soviet Union, in particular, will carefully examine our proposals, so that we may move forward towards agreement in this most important, most vital, area of nuclear weapons.

Mr. LALL (India): I should like to say two things today, very briefly. The first is that we have now had a very long discussion in this Committee on items 5 (b) and 5 (c) of our agenda. I am not at all clear whether that discussion has ended, but certainly one of our co-Chairmen assumes that in practice it has ended for the present.

We have taken note that the United States co-Chairman has suggested that the subject should remain under examination by the two co-Chairmen. We should like to suggest that, when the co-Chairmen decide to examine it between themselves, they should try to prepare a paper setting out succinctly the remaining areas of disagreement with regard to vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. What we have in mind is that, unless some such thing is done, the long discussions which we have had will tend, we believe, to be lost. That should not happen, because while those discussions have not yet resulted in agreement they have, we believe, brought forth from both sides valuable clarification of their positions. Indeed, there have been some remarks made by representatives of the non-aligned countries which might also be taken into account in drawing up a paper on the present position and, more specifically, on the remaining areas of difference. We hope that the two co-Chairmen will consider that suggestion.

The second point to which I wish to refer does not concern general and complete disarmament. It concerns the nuclear test ban. Our delegation would like to say that it welcomed the information which it gained yesterday from the newspapers -- we have not heard it contradicted, and we assume it is correct -- that the President of the United States has cancelled certain underground nuclear tests which were due to take place later this month. We note that the tests have been not postponed but cancelled. We feel that that is a development very much in line with the hope of the whole world that nuclear tests should stop, and we look forward to other measures by the leaders of the two sides to fulfil that hope.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Our United States colleague has again suggested (supra, p. 31) that the time has come when we might profitably leave items 5 (b) and 5 (c) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) and proceed to item 5 (d). That is a course which has been suggested or supported on previous occasions by other

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delegations, including my own. I wish to support the proposal, and I find nothing to counteract its desirability in the long statement which we have heard this morning from our Soviet colleague.

In the course of that statement Mr. Tsarapkin described me as naive (supra, p.8). Coming from him, and in the context in which it was offered, I think perhaps I should regard the description as a compliment, whether or not he meant it so. I am certainly not naive enough to think, or to suggest, that in his statement this morning he has given anything like a satisfactory answer to any one of the many questions which the United Kingdom, among others, has asked him on the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40), and which the leader of my delegation, Mr. Godber, listed again at the end of his statement on 8 May (ENDC/PV.129, p.39).

However, I think the statement our Soviet colleague made this morning is one which deserves careful analysis, and if -- I stress "if" -- I should find on reading it carefully that even a small corner of the mists which I previously described as surrounding Mr. Tsarapkin whenever he speaks on this subject has been lifted to the smallest degree, I should think all the more that the subject was one which now deserved consideration by the two co-Chairmen for subsequent report back to the Committee. I am sure that we should all hope that, if such private discussions were held, they would be more fruitful than our discussions here on the subject have been so far.

As our United States colleague indicated this morning, we shall of course have to return to items 5 (b) and 5 (c) at a later date. I hope that, when we do, the Soviet Government will have reconsidered its position on that subject. In my view neither our Soviet colleague nor his colleagues from Eastern Europe have put forward any sound arguments against the Western proposals for a 30 per cent cut across-the-board in all major armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, in stage I. And now that we are moving on to item 5 (d) I hope very much that the Soviet Government will take the opportunity to re-examine the Western proposals for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I.

Our United States colleague this morning has outlined fairly fully the various stage I measures of nuclear disarmament which have been proposed by the West. Those are important and substantial measures, and the United Kingdom delegation looks

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forward to solid and, I trust, really fruitful discussions on this subject. This morning I only want to draw the Committee's attention to one or two of the Western proposals, and I shall do so very briefly.

First, we look forward to hearing the considered views of our Soviet colleague on the proposal that, after a cut-off, the United States and the Soviet Governments should transfer agreed and significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. As Western representatives have pointed out in the past, and as Mr. Stelle repeated today (supra, p. 34), that proposal could have an important effect on the nuclear capabilities of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Committee will have noted the suggestion made this morning by our United States colleague (supra, p. 36) that his Government would be flexible about the amount of fissile material to be transferred. I am sure that we shall all have listened to that with approval, and we in the United Kingdom, for our part, urge our Soviet colleague to study the proposal carefully and to give us his considered views.

Then again, our United States colleague devoted a part of his statement this morning to another point which of course will require a great deal of attention from the Committee during our forthcoming discussions. I am referring to the very difficult problems involved in working out adequate and effective verification measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is quite obvious to all of us that we are dealing on this point with one of the really crucial issues in any programme of disarmament.

Mr. Stelle reminded the Committee this morning of the working paper (ENDC/60) submitted by the United Kingdom delegation at our 77th meeting on 31 August last and entitled "The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production". I am sure that the Soviet Government, like the rest of us, recognizes that there are real and complicated problems in this field. I dare say I am not going too far when I express the hope that the Soviet Government would not wish to dissent from the analysis and the conclusions set out in the document to which I have referred. I hope, in fact, that that working paper, which my colleagues and their Governments have now had over eight months to consider, may serve a dual purpose: as

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a basis for our discussions on verification measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and as a basis for the technical studies which, as Mr. Stelle suggested to the Committee this morning (supra, p.37), could begin here as soon as delegations were prepared, and which need not necessarily await the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I should like to say a few words as representative of Sweden.

First, I should like to thank Mr. Tsarapkin for having remembered the statement I made on 17 August last year and for having quoted from it. As there has been a great deal of discussion today about control, I feel tempted to quote two further sentences from that statement. At that time I said:

"In any case, do not let us be over-ambitious regarding control, nor too suspicious about the implications of inspection and verification. ... Do not let us be influenced or over-awed by the fact that the United States and the USSR seem to hold rather contradictory views in this field of control and verification. I do not think that those differences exist solely or mainly because of the present political configuration of the world. The problems which we face are to such a degree psychological and general in nature that I venture to suggest that, had not the two great Powers brought them into focus, others would have felt obliged to do so. What we can hope for and what we should ask is that the problems be not unduly complicated by the fact that opposite views are presented by the two Powers just referred to, but should be dealt with through objective, painstakingly detailed analysis." (ENDC/PV.71, p.35)

I should like to comment briefly on the suggestion made by the representative of India, Mr. Lall (supra, p.38). I believe it would be useful for all of us to have a synopsis of -- as Mr. Lall put it -- the differences regarding the subject under discussion. But I should like to add two words to his suggestion. I should like to say not only "differences" but also our difficulties and problems, because I feel that what we call "differences" are very often problems that we find too difficult to solve.

(The chairman, Sweden)

I think Mr. Lall's suggestion was also constructive in that it put renewed emphasis on the institution of the co-Chairmen. This Conference is certainly dependent to a fairly large extent upon our co-Chairmen. The better they co-operate, the more they synchronize their work, the easier will it be for us to discuss, to work and to reach results. Therefore I humbly submit to our two co-Chairmen that they should give serious consideration to the suggestion put forward by the representative of India.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The statement made today by the United States representative showed a certain tendency to depart from what the representative of India, Mr. Lall, had in mind and what has just been pointed out by our Chairman, the representative of Sweden, Baron von Platen, with regard to the institution of the co-Chairmen. The co-Chairmen have as yet made no decision to put an end to the discussion of item 5 (b), and what we have heard today from the United States representative is not an agreed recommendation of the co-Chairmen, but a purely arbitrary, unilateral initiative of the representative of the United States. Apparently the United States representative is showing a new tendency with regard to the organization of the work in our Conference. If that is so, it is being done without our consent and the Soviet Union bears no responsibility in that regard. That, of course, is the United States' own affair.

We understand that the United States representative obviously does not wish for any further discussion of item 5 (b), on the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons with retention by the United States and the Soviet Union of a strictly limited number of missiles. It may be that the United States has nothing to say; but it would be more accurate to say, not that it has nothing to say, but that it does not want to discuss this question and does not want any agreement on it. But the fact that the United States has nothing to say or does not want to discuss this question still does not mean that the others must accept its point of view and abandon any further discussion of the question.

Today the representative of Canada, a member of the NATO military bloc, expressed a number of views on the question under discussion. I intend to answer him at our

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

next meeting, and to reply to the earlier statements of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding our proposal. We all see quite clearly that this subject is far from exhausted, and the attempt to have it referred to the co-Chairmen when there is absolutely no agreement between us or even any rapprochement of our positions is a manoeuvre that would mean simply withdrawing this question from discussion in the Committee. We cannot agree to such a manoeuvre in our Committee. We must act in good faith, and if there is still a need for discussion we must not abandon it. That is why I have already said and repeat again that at our next meeting, when we turn to the question of disarmament, we shall have something to say and shall make our comments on a number of views, arguments and proposals which have been put forward by other delegations on the question we are discussing.

As for the proposal put forward today by the United States representative, we think that we shall deal with that subject as well in due course, since it is not a "crucial" one, as the United Kingdom representative tried to make out in his statement supporting the United States proposal (supra, p. 40). We have already analysed fairly thoroughly the proposals put forward by the United States representative. Everyone recognizes that our main task is to eliminate the danger of a nuclear missile war. What does the United States proposal offer in this regard? Absolutely nothing. We shall prove that with the utmost cogency when we come to that question. If the United States has a crisis of overproduction of fissionable materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, that is your internal affair -- cope with that problem yourselves; you can cut down production of fissionable materials for military needs. You can transfer from military production not 50, but perhaps 100, 200 or 300 tons to peaceful uses. You can do that by your own domestic procedure without involving our Committee in a discussion of this domestic problem of yours.

But if you really wish for the implementation of measures aimed at nuclear disarmament, at the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war, then for this there is an excellent and effective way out of the situation. There is article 22 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1). This article provides for a whole number of measures aimed at nuclear disarmament. It provides for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production,

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the elimination of nuclear weapons from the armaments of States, the transfer of all nuclear materials to peaceful uses, and control over all nuclear industry and the production of nuclear weapons. These measures are really aimed at eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war.

We shall come back to this in greater detail and make a thorough analysis of the United States proposals and of the proposals which the Soviet Union proposes to carry out for this purpose. If you, the United States representative, really wish to eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war or at least to reduce it in stage I, if your desires are directed towards that, we are prepared -- and we have said so repeatedly before -- to transfer our measures laid down in article 22 from the second stage of disarmament to the first stage. We state this officially and are prepared to do so very gladly, provided of course that the United States and the United Kingdom agree, since without their agreement there is nothing we can do.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): My delegation is one of those which proposed that we should pass to the next business. We did so because we have now been discussing Mr. Gromyko's proposal for I think, two months, and we ourselves have asked a whole series of specific questions in order to have a thorough grasp of its substance. Now, as I have already said, many of these questions have still not been answered. Yet again this morning the Soviet Union representative, in his long statement, merely repeated the brief explanations that we had already heard, refraining from replying to the serious questions that my delegation, among others, had put to him at the last meeting devoted to the problem of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.129, p.25).

My delegation asked what the Soviet delegation proposed regarding control and the development of the control of nuclear vehicles other than intercontinental missiles in the first stage. We asked for the Soviet delegation's views on the application of control, at the end of the first stage, over the 100 per cent elimination of vehicles other than intercontinental missiles. We said that, since this was a total disarmament measure, we thought that equally total control should be applied, but that we had no idea at all whether that was the Soviet delegation's view.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

All those questions put by my delegation, and others asked by the other Western delegations, are still unanswered today. So one really wonders why we should continue discussing the Gromyko proposal, listening to very long statements by the Soviet delegation which make no contribution to our negotiations but are rather propaganda speeches in which we are repeatedly told that the Soviet delegation wishes to eliminate immediately the threat of nuclear war, a desire which everyone knows is shared by all the Western delegations, if that were a realistic possibility.

These are my delegation's reasons for proposing that we pass on to the next business.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): It struck me that there was a certain inconsistency in the last remarks of our Soviet colleague (supra, p. 42). He accused the United States of not being willing to discuss items 5 (b) and 5 (c) of our agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) which relate, of course, to the reduction of armaments; but at the same time he opposed our proposal to transfer the discussion of those items, for the time being, to the two co-Chairmen. We are of course quite willing and want to discuss them with our co-Chairman, and we thought that was the sense of the proposal of the representative of India: that the two co-Chairmen should consult together and see if they could, as I understood, jointly prepare a succinct statement of our areas of disagreement on the question of reduction of armaments. I should like to say that my delegation is quite willing and ready to follow that suggestion, as we understand it, at any time that our Soviet colleague is willing to co-operate with us in that endeavour.

Mr. Tsarapkin had some things to say about my delegation's moving on to the next item on our agenda, which deals with measures of nuclear disarmament. He was quite correct in saying that it was not in response to an agreed recommendation of the co-Chairmen. However, I do not think that he could have been surprised by our proceeding to discussion of the next item, for he has been on notice for some weeks that that was our intention failing agreement between the co-Chairmen to move on.

I welcome the fact that our Soviet colleague began to discuss, and said that he would further discuss in statements at future meetings, the measures dealing with

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

nuclear disarmament. I hope that, when he does, it will be a serious discussion, and that we shall not again meet the Soviet position, which unfortunately was repeated this morning, that if everything cannot be done there is no utility in doing something. The Soviet position seems to be that if the threat of nuclear war cannot be completely eliminated in stage I, then it is useless to consider other measures. We do not hold that opinion; we recognize the real and complex problems involved in complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war, which is of course our sincere objective; but we think that there are useful things that we can do on the way towards that objective, and the proposals made by my delegation this morning are directed towards that end.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): The procedural situation seems to me to be rather confused. The representative of the United States has introduced into the discussion of our Committee a new subject, which has also been taken up by the representative of the United Kingdom; and we have had a statement by the representative of Italy, who tried to justify that kind of procedure by saying that he cannot continue the discussion of item 5 (b) because he has not had adequate and satisfactory replies to his questions. I do not want to go into that point, although of course I would have something to say about it except that the hour is rather late.

It seems to me that we have in any case to reach a decision about what we are going to do on Wednesday of next week. We have been rather accustomed in this Committee to the two co-Chairmen getting together and presenting to us an agreed recommendation on the order of business. Even if they disagreed about the order of business they were ready to tell us about it, and we then knew exactly where we stood. It seems to me that we should not return here next Wednesday without having some sort of clarity in our minds about what we are going to discuss.

If I may make a suggestion, I would propose that we ask our two co-Chairmen to consider the procedural situation which has developed today and to present us with an agreed recommendation perhaps not later than, say, Monday next. It seems to me that in any case we should not let the situation develop in such a way that two subjects are discussed at the same time. That, it seems to me, would be a very unfortunate situation.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirty-second plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Baron von Platen, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Canada, Bulgaria, the United States, India, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy and Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 17 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

